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NARROW BANKING AS A
STRUCTURAL REMEDY FOR THE
PROBLEM OF SYSTEMIC RISK: A
COMMENT ON PROFESSOR
SCHWARCZ’S RING-FENCING
ARTHUR E. WILMARTH, JR.*
In Ring-Fencing,1 Professor Steven Schwarcz provides an insightful
overview of the concept of “ring-fencing” as a “potential regulatory
solution to problems in banking, finance, public utilities, and insurance.”2
As Professor Schwarcz explains, “ring-fencing can best be understood as
legally deconstructing a firm in order to more optimally reallocate and
reduce risk.”3 Ring-fencing has gained particular prominence in recent
years as a strategy for limiting the systemic risk of large financial
conglomerates (also referred to herein as “universal banks”). Professor
Schwarcz describes several ring-fencing plans that have been adopted or
proposed in the United States, United Kingdom, and European Union.4
This Comment argues that “narrow banking” is a highly promising
ring-fencing remedy for the problems created by universal banks. Narrow
banking would strictly separate the deposit-taking function of universal
banks from their capital markets activities. If properly implemented,
narrow banking could significantly reduce the safety net subsidies currently
*.
Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. I am grateful to Peter ContiBrown for helpful comments on a preliminary draft of this Comment. This Comment includes
developments through June 30, 2014.
1.
Steven L. Schwarcz, Ring-Fencing, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 69 (2013).
2.
Id. at 70.
3.
Id. at 71.
4.
Id. at 78–81, 98–105 (summarizing the regulatory approaches of the Vickers Report, the
Glass-Steagall Act, and the Volcker Rule).
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exploited by large financial conglomerates and thereby diminish their
incentives for excessive risk-taking.
I. THE DEMISE OF GLASS-STEAGALL AND THE RE-EMERGENCE
OF UNIVERSAL BANKS AS SOURCES OF SYSTEMIC RISK
Professor Schwarcz points out that Congress adopted a particularly
stringent form of ring-fencing in the Banking Act of 1933, popularly
known as the Glass-Steagall Act (“Glass-Steagall”), which responded to
the collapse of the U.S. banking system during the Great Depression.5 In
addition to creating a new federal scheme for insuring bank deposits,
Glass-Steagall went beyond conventional notions of ring-fencing by
requiring banks to divest all of their securities affiliates.6 Congress
determined that (1) federal deposit insurance was urgently needed to
prevent contagious runs by bank depositors, and (2) an absolute separation
between commercial and investment banking was required to prevent banks
from engaging in speculative capital markets activities similar to those that
triggered an unsustainable boom during the 1920s and inflicted heavy
losses on major banks during the early 1930s.7
As Professor Schwarcz observes, deposit insurance and GlassSteagall’s separation of commercial and investment banking had the virtue
of “safeguarding deposits and reducing the risks of bank runs.”8 In
addition, Professor Luigi Zingales has pointed out that Glass-Steagall
“deprived investment banks of access to cheap funds (in the form of
deposits), forcing them to limit their size and the size of their bets.”9 The
barriers erected by Glass-Steagall also made U.S. financial markets “more
resilient” by reducing the risks of contagion between banks and securities
firms.10 With Glass-Steagall in place, the United States did not experience

5.
Id. at 79–80, 98–101.
6.
Id. at 98 (explaining that Glass-Steagall “legally deconstructed banks by separating their
deposit-taking activities from their riskier investment banking activities”). I am indebted to Peter ContiBrown for suggesting that Glass-Steagall’s divestiture mandate was a remedy that was more farreaching than most current understandings of “ring-fencing.”
7.
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and
the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 974 (2009) [hereinafter Wilmarth,
Dark Side]; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Did Universal Banks Play a Significant Role in the U.S.
Economy’s Boom-and-Bust Cycle of 1921–33? A Preliminary Assessment, in 4 CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN MONETARY AND FINANCIAL LAW 559, 564–85 (Int’l Monetary Fund ed.,2005)
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=838267 [hereinafter Wilmarth, Universal Banks and the 1920s].
8.
Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 99.
9.
Luigi Zingales, Why I Was Won over by Glass-Steagall, FIN. TIMES (June 10, 2012),
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cb3e52be-b08d-11e1-8b36-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3GLJiz6KK.
10.
Id. (pointing out that “commercial banks were untouched by plummeting equity prices”

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2571000
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any systemic banking crises from the mid-1930s to the late 1970s.11
Glass-Steagall’s barriers came under increasing pressure after 1980, as
large banks pushed to expand into securities and insurance activities in
response to competition from bank-like products offered by securities firms
and insurance companies.12 Federal regulators and courts issued a series of
decisions that opened numerous loopholes in Glass-Steagall between 1987
and 1998, and Congress finally repealed Glass-Steagall’s key provisions in
1999.13 At that point, banks were free to affiliate with securities firms and
insurance companies by forming financial holding companies, which
offered a full array of financial services to retail and commercial
customers.14
In response to the demise of Glass-Steagall and similar legal
developments in the United Kingdom and the European Union, large
universal banks quickly captured leading shares in financial markets on
both sides of the Atlantic.15 The market leadership achieved by universal
banks during the 2000s rivaled the dominant positions their predecessors
occupied during the 1920s.16 The new universal banks aggravated the “too
big to fail” (“TBTF”) problem and created a near-certainty that government
“safety nets” for banks—including deposit insurance and emergency
lending facilities provided by central banks—would be extended to cover
nonbank affiliates owned by large financial conglomerates. As the safety
net widened (at least implicitly) to embrace securities and insurance
affiliates of universal banks, it also increased the likelihood that a systemic
financial crisis would spur governmental authorities to help other major
during the stock market crash of 1987, while “securities markets helped alleviate the credit crunch [in
1990–91] because they were unaffected by the banking crisis” of the early 1990s). See also Arthur E.
Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975-2000: Competition,
Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 441 (discussing the same anticontagion
benefits created by Glass-Steagall's separation of the banking and securities industries).
11.
Peter Eavis, Senators Introduce Bill to Separate Trading Activities From Big Banks, N.Y.
TIMES (July 12, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/07/11/senators-introduce-bill-to-separatetrading-activities-from-big-banks/ (“During the era of Glass-Steagall, there were no systemic banking
crises like the one that occurred in 2008”). See also Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 225–27, 239
(describing the relatively stable, low-risk nature of the banking industry from the mid-1930s to the late
1970s).
12.
Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 219–21, 230–34, 238–41, 318–20.
13.
Id. at 219–21, 306–07, 318–20.
14.
Wilmarth, Dark Side, supra note 7, at 972–80.
15.
Id. at 975–81, 994–97, 1012–13, 1017–20; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A
Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 966, 98485
(2011) [hereinafter Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank and TBTF].
16.
Wilmarth, Dark Side, supra note 7, at 974–97; Wilmarth, Universal Banks and the 1920s,
supra note 7, at 569–78.
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firms in the securities and insurance sectors.17
The new universal banks and their competitors in the capital
markets—particularly the five largest U.S. securities firms and the biggest
U.S. insurer (AIG)—created a wide array of innovative financial
instruments, including subprime mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”), cash
flow and synthetic collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”) and credit
default swaps (“CDS”).18 With the cooperation of credit ratings agencies
(which were paid handsomely for their services), financial conglomerates
used those financial instruments to transform trillions of dollars of risky
debt into AAA-rated securities that were sold to yield-hungry investors
around the world. The resulting surge of high-risk debt generated a massive
and unsustainable credit boom in the United States, United Kingdom and
European Union.19 During the 1920s, universal banks triggered a similar
credit boom, in part by using comparable methods of packaging risky debt
into seemingly “safe” securities that were distributed to investors on both
sides of the Atlantic.20
Eighteen large financial conglomerates from the United States, United
Kingdom, and European Union were responsible for the lion’s share of the
structured-finance securities and related derivatives that were outstanding
at the height of the credit boom in 2007.21 The same conglomerates became
the “epicenter” of the worldwide financial crisis that occurred when the
credit bubble burst in 2007 and 2008.22 Only one member of the “big
eighteen” failed outright (Lehman Brothers), but governmental authorities
in the United States, United Kingdom and European Union “provided
extensive assistance to ensure the survival of at least twelve other members
17.
Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 446–76 (predicting in 2002 that regulators would expand the
federal safety net to cover securities and insurance affiliates of unversal banks, thereby making the
federal government the de facto guarantor of large sectors of the capital markets); Wilmarth, Dark Side,
supra note 7, at 1049–50 (observing in 2009 that events during the global financial crisis “confirmed”
my 2002 predictions).
18.
Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank and TBTF, supra note 15, at 963–67; Wilmarth, Dark Side, supra
note 7, at 984–96, 1020–43.
19.
Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank and TBTF, supra note 15, at 963–71; Wilmarth, Dark Side, supra
note 7, at 1002–20, 1043–46.
20.
Wilmarth, Universal Banks and the 1920s, supra note 7, at 569–85, 612–13.
21.
Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank and TBTF, supra note 15, at 966 & n.45 (listing eighteen global
financial conglomerates—including the four largest U.S. banks, the five largest U.S. securities firms,
the largest U.S. insurer (AIG), and eight universal banks from the United Kingdom and European
Union—that dominated global markets for securities and derivatives during the credit boom that peaked
in 2007).
22.
Id. at 978 (noting that the “big eighteen” financial conglomerates “accounted for three-fifths
of the $1.5 trillion of total worldwide losses recorded by banks, securities firms, and insurers
between . . . mid-2007 and the spring of 2010”).
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of the group.”23
II. RING-FENCING AS A POTENTIAL REMEDY FOR THE
SYSTEMIC RISK CREATED BY UNIVERSAL BANKS
As I explained in a 2014 case study of Citigroup, “the universal
banking model is deeply flawed by its excessive organizational complexity,
its vulnerability to culture clashes and conflicts of interest, and its tendency
to permit excessive risk-taking within far-flung, semi-autonomous units
that lack adequate oversight from either senior management or regulatory
agencies.”24 The global financial crisis has also shown that large universal
banks receive enormous government subsidies due to their TBTF status,
and those subsidies “create significant economic distortions and promote
moral hazard.”25 Regulators on both sides of the Atlantic have agreed that
reforms to remove TBTF subsidies and reduce the systemic risk of
financial conglomerates are urgently needed and must be given top
priority.26
Professor Schwarcz points out that ring-fencing has emerged as a
prominent strategy for restraining systemic risk after the financial crisis.27
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(“Dodd-Frank”) contains two provisions—the Volcker Rule (Section 619)
and the Lincoln Amendment (Section 726)—that seek to establish at least a
partial separation between banks and the risks of securities and derivatives
activities.28 The Volcker Rule prohibits banks from engaging in
“proprietary trading” (that is, buying and selling securities, derivatives, and
23.
Id. at 979.
24.
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Citigroup: A Case Study in Managerial and Regulatory Failures, 47
IND. L. REV. 69, 136 (2014).
25.
Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank and TBTF, supra note 15, at 981 982–85. See also Arthur E.
Wilmarth, Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving in to Wall Street, 81 U. CIN. L. REV.
1283, 1313–14 (2013) [hereinafter Wilmarth, Blind Eye] (citing additional studies confirming the
existence of TBTF subsidies for large banks). For a recent analysis of TBTF subsidies exploited by
megabanks in the United States, United Kingdom and European Union, see INT’L MONETARY FUND,
GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: MOVING FROM LIQUIDITY TO GROWTH-DRIVEN MARKETS
101–30 (2014), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2014/01/pdf/text.pdf.
26.
Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank and TBTF, supra note 15, at 980–81 (quoting speeches by former
Federal Reserve Board chairman Ben Bernanke and Bank of England Governor Mervyn King); Huw
Jones, Update 1—IMF’s Lagarde Says Bank Reforms Slowed by Fierce Industry Pushback, REUTERS
(May
27,
2014),
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/05/27/imf-lagarde-regulationsidUKL6N0OD1XA20140527 (quoting remarks by International Monetary Fund Managing Director
Christine Lagarde and Bank of England Governor Mark Carney emphasizing the need to complete
reforms that would effectively address the problems created by TBTF banks).
27.
Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 78–81, 101–05.
28.
Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank and TBTF, supra note 15, at 1025–34 (describing the Volcker Rule
and the Lincoln Amendment).
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other tradable assets for their own account) and limits the ability of banks
to sponsor or invest in hedge funds and private equity funds.29 The Lincoln
Amendment generally precludes the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(“FDIC”) and the Federal Reserve System (“Fed”) from providing direct
financial assistance to firms that deal in swaps and other over-the-counter
derivatives.30 The purpose of the Lincoln Amendment is to force banks to
transfer their derivatives trading operations to separate nonbank affiliates.31
Unfortunately, due to vigorous lobbying by the financial industry
during Congress’s consideration of Dodd-Frank, the Volcker Rule and the
Lincoln Amendment are “riddled with loopholes and have long phase-in
periods.”32 As a result of additional lobbying after Dodd-Frank’s passage,
(1) final regulations to implement the Volcker Rule were not issued until
December 2013, and the effectiveness of those regulations remains a matter
of serious doubt;33 and (2) bank regulators have extended the Lincoln
Amendment’s compliance deadline for an additional two years, until July
2015, and the financial industry is pushing to repeal the provision before it
takes effect.34 Thus, Dodd-Frank’s attempts at partial ring-fencing are
highly porous and are not likely to have a significant impact on risk-taking
by universal banks.35
29.
Id. at 1025–28.
30.
Id. at 1030–31.
31.
Id. See also id. at 1044–45 (discussing the exploitation of federal safety net subsidies by
bank dealers in derivatives).
32.
Id. at 1024. See also id. at 1028–29 (describing major exceptions to the Volcker Rule,
including the ability of banks to engage in “market making” and “risk-mitigating hedging”); id. at
1032–33 (describing similar exceptions in the Lincoln Amendment, which allow banks to engage in
“[h]edging and other similar risk-mitigating activities” and to trade certain categories of swaps).
33.
See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don't “Screw Joe the Plumber”: The Sausage-Making of
Financial Reform, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 53 passim (2013) (describing the financial industry’s lobbying
campaign against the implementation of the Volcker Rule); Wilmarth, Blind Eye, supra note 25, at
1302–04, 1367–68 (same); Donna Borak, Cheat Sheet: Regulators Release Specifics on the Final
Volcker Rule, AM. BANKER, Dec. 11, 2013, 2013 WLNR 30916756 (describing major exemptions
contained in the final regulations implementing the Volcker Rule); Donna Borak, Banks, Lawyers
Struggling to Evaluate Final Volcker Rule, AM. BANKER, Dec. 12, 2013, 2013 WLNR 31040668
(reporting that the final Volcker Rule regulations “were careful to avoid drawing bright lines and setting
explicit limits, introducing numerous gray areas with ample room for judgment” about the scope of
various exemptions).
34.
Silla Brush, Fed Grants Foreign Banks Leeway in Dodd-Frank Swap Rule, BLOOMBERG
(June 5, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-05/fed-grants-foreign-banks-leeway-indodd-frank-swap-pushout.html (reporting that the Federal Reserve and the Comptroller of the Currency
granted domestic and foreign banks an additional two-year exemption, until July 2015, to come into
compliance with the Lincoln Amendment); Charlene Carter & Kate Ackley, Second House Panel Backs
Repeal of Swaps Provision from Dodd-Frank, CQ WEEKLY, May 13, 2013, at 846, 2013 WLNR
12271124 (“Large Wall Street banks are pushing for [the repeal of Section 716] as a high priority.”).
35.
Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank and TBTF, supra note 15, at 1023–24, 1028–35.
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The United Kingdom and European Union have considered more
stringent ring-fencing proposals. In December 2013, the UK Parliament
enacted legislation based on ring-fencing proposals contained in the
Vickers Report. The new legislation authorizes regulators to separate
“retail” activities of large UK banks—including deposit-taking and lending
to consumers and small business firms—from their capital markets
activities.36 However, the UK legislation will not take effect until 2019, and
the financial industry has vigorously lobbied UK regulators to adopt
implementing regulations that would punch many loopholes in the Vickers
ring-fence.37
In the European Union, the Liikanen Report proposed that large banks
should transfer high-risk trading and other capital markets activities into
ring-fenced affiliates.38 After heavy lobbying by large European banks,
Michael Barnier, the EU commissioner for financial services, issued a
legislative blueprint that is significantly weaker than the original Liikanen
proposal.39 Even with Barnier’s concessions, it is unlikely that the
European Parliament will enact Barnier’s plan in the near future.40
III. THE CASE FOR NARROW BANKING
As shown above, the United States, United Kingdom, and European
Union have considered various ring-fencing proposals, but none of them
has yet mandated structural firewalls that would be comparable to a
rigorous “narrow banking” plan. As I have previously shown, a strict form
of narrow banking could (1) stop financial conglomerates from using the
federal safety net to subsidize their speculative capital markets activities
and (2) make it more feasible for regulators to separate deposit-taking
36.
Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 78–79; 101–05 (describing the Vickers Report’s proposals); Jill
Treanor, Andrew Tyrie on Banking Reform ‘If We Get it Right the Industry Will be Stronger’,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 29, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/dec/29/andrew-tyrie-bankingreform-industry-stronger (discussing Parliament's enactment of the “ringfence” proposed by the Vickers
Report).
37.
Sam Fleming, Sharlene Goff & Martin Arnold, Banks Horse-trade on Ringfence Fine Print,
FIN.
TIMES
(Aug.
14,
2014),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/dfd4da64-23b2-11e4-8e2900144feabdc0.html#axzz3InQ2KOXJ.
38.
Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 81; Jim Brunsden, EU Weighs Bank-Structure Overhaul in Wake
of Liikanen Plan, BLOOMBERG (May 17, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-17/euweighs-bank-structure-overhaul-in-wake-of-liikanen-plan-1-.html.
39.
Alex Barker & Sam Fleming, EU Bank Overhaul Pleases Few in Search for Middle Way,
FIN.
TIMES
(Jan.
29,
2014),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3cb5bd5c-8903-11e3-bb5f00144feab7de.html#axzz3GvgsCoQp.
40.
Id.; Jim Brunsden & Eshe Nelson, Bank-Structure Plan Dealt Blow as EU Lawmaker Says
No Time, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 28, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-28/bank-structureoverhaul-dealt-blow-as-eu-lawmaker-says-no-time.html.
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banks from their nonbank affiliates when conglomerates fail.41 Narrow
banking would also provide a common trans-Atlantic basis for regulating
and resolving systemically important financial institutions (“SIFIs”) if the
United States, United Kingdom, and European Union jointly agreed to
adopt a stringent version of the principles underlying the Vickers and
Liikanen Reports.
Narrow banking would require deposit-taking banks owned by
financial conglomerates to limit their assets to cash and marketable, shortterm debt obligations, such as government securities, commercial paper,
and other money market instruments eligible for investment by money
market mutual funds. Narrow banks could not accept uninsured deposits or
issue other uninsured liabilities. A narrow bank would present a very
limited risk to the FDIC, because its non-cash assets would consist solely
of short-term, marketable obligations that could readily be converted into
cash if the FDIC needed to liquidate the bank and pay off its insured
depositors.42
Narrow banks would be absolutely prohibited from making any
extensions of credit or other transfers of funds to their nonbank affiliates,
except for the payment of lawful dividends to their parent holding
companies. The absolute prohibition on affiliate transactions would prevent
conglomerate-owned banks from transferring their safety net subsidies to
their nonbank affiliates, including those engaged in capital markets
operations.43 Barring affiliate transactions would also make it easier for
regulators to separate SIFI-owned banks from their parent holding
companies and other nonbank affiliates, thereby advancing Dodd-Frank’s
provisions requiring SIFIs to develop feasible resolution plans (“living
wills”).44 In addition, narrow banks would be forbidden from purchasing
derivatives except as end-users in bona fide hedging transactions under the
strict rules of Financial Accounting Standard Statement No. 133.45
My narrow banking plan would also bar the FDIC from rescuing
creditors of affiliates of narrow banks. Accordingly, I have proposed that
Congress should repeal the “systemic risk exception” (“SRE”) currently
41.
The following discussion is adapted from my narrow banking proposal presented in
Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank and TBTF, supra note 15, at 1034–52.
42.
Id. at 1038.
43.
Id. at 1041–42.
44.
Id. at 1050.
45.
Id. at 1043–44 (noting that such a prohibition “would accomplish an essential goal of the
Volcker Rule and the Lincoln Amendment”). See also id. at 1036 (discussing Financial Accounting
Standard Statement No. 133).
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embodied in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.46 A repeal of the SRE
would preclude the use of deposit insurance funds “to support a bailout of
uninsured creditors of a failed or failing SIFI.”47
To further reduce subsidies for SIFIs, my plan would require SIFIs to
pay risk-based premiums to prefund the Orderly Liquidation Fund
(“OLF”), which provides financing for the liquidation of failed SIFIs under
Dodd-Frank’s Orderly Liquidation Authority (“OLA”).48 As a result of
Wall Street’s highly effective lobbying, Dodd-Frank does not provide a
prefunding mechanism for the OLF, and the FDIC is therefore required to
rely on bridge loans from the Treasury Department (that is, the taxpayers)
in order to finance liquidations of SIFIs.49 By requiring SIFIs to prefund
the OLF, my plan would compel SIFIs to “internalize more of the ‘negative
externality’ (i.e., the potential public bailout cost) of their activities.”50
My narrow banking plan is designed to restore market discipline by
forcing financial conglomerates to demonstrate that “they can produce
superior risk-related returns to investors without relying on explicit and
implicit government subsidies.”51 Universal banks have failed to generate
consistently positive returns, even with the federal subsidies they currently
exploit.52 Financial conglomerates should be subjected to “the same type of
[market] scrutiny and discipline” that forced the breakup of many
commercial and industrial conglomerates.53 If the current subsidies for
SIFIs were removed, I believe many of them would be compelled to break
up voluntarily.
Policymakers and analysts have debated whether narrow banking
would go far enough to control the risks of universal banks. Some argue
that only a reinstatement of Glass-Steagall’s absolute barriers between
commercial banking and the capital markets would be adequate to prevent
46.
Id. at 1001, 1022–23 (explaining that the SRE could be used, in the context of failed bank
receiverships, “to protect the creditors of SIFI-owned banks (including, potentially, the parent
companies of such banks)”).
47.
Id. at 1042–43.
48.
Id. at 1049–50. See also id. at 996–99, 1015 (describing the OLF and OLA).
49.
Id. at 1015–19.
50.
Id. at 1021–22 (noting also that a prefunded OLF would “shield governments and taxpayers
from at least ‘first-loss’ exposure for the cost of resolving future failures of SIFIs”).
51.
Id. at 1046 (emphasis added).
52.
Id. at 1046–47. See also Wilmarth, supra note 24, at 110–14 (discussing the heavy losses
suffered by Citigroup’s shareholders since 2007).
53.
Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank and TBTF, supra note 15, at 1047 (“[M]any of the largest
commercial and industrial conglomerates in the United States and Europe were broken up through
hostile takeovers and voluntary divestitures during the past three decades.”).
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a recurrence of the recent financial crisis.54 Others contend that narrow
banking would be a sufficient and more politically feasible approach,
because it would remove public subsidies from large banking companies
without forcing them to divest all of their capital markets activities.55
In view of the long odds against any re-enactment of Glass-Steagall,56
narrow banking appears to be a promising and more likely alternative.
Narrow banking would highlight the importance of removing current
market-distorting public subsidies for universal banks. In addition, it would
not compel a particular structural outcome but instead would enable
financial markets to discipline universal banks in a manner similar to
industrial and commercial conglomerates. Properly understood, the case for
narrow banking would compel defenders of the status quo to argue for the
continuation of public subsidies for SIFIs and against the unfettered
operation of market discipline within the financial system. That is an
argument proponents of financial reform should win.

54.
E.g., Eavis, supra note 11 (reporting on the proposed “21st Century Glass-Steagall Act”
introduced in 2013 by Senators Maria Cantwell, Angus King, John McCain, and Elizabeth Warren);
Liam Halligan, Only Full Separation Will Make Our Big Banks Safe, TELEGRAPH (May 10, 2014),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/10822521/Only-full-separation-will-make-our-big-bankssafe.html.
55.
E.g., Jill Treanor, Architect of Ringfencing Says it Will Avert Need to Split Banks,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/money/2012/nov/12/architect-ringfencingavert-need-split-banks (quoting testimony of John Vickers before a committee of the UK Parliament).
56.
Eavis, supra note 11 (describing the formidable political obstacles confronting those who
support a new Glass-Steagall Act).

